DDASaccident151 by Database, Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident
James Madison University
JMU Scholarly Commons
Global CWD Repository Center for International Stabilization and Recovery
8-25-1997
DDASaccident151
Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident Database
AID
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons,
Public Policy Commons, and the Social Policy Commons
This Other is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery at JMU Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Global CWD Repository by an authorized administrator of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact dc_admin@jmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Database, Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident, "DDASaccident151" (1997). Global CWD Repository. 351.
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd/351
DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 17/05/2006 Accident number: 151 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 25/08/1997 
Where it occurred: Qalai Muslim, Ward 7, 
Kabul 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Demolition accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: OZM-3 AP Bfrag Ground condition: grass/grazing area 
hard 
Date record created: 13/02/2004 Date  last modified: 13/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inconsistent statements (?) 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
 
Accident report 
At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams 
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on 
vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly 
"controlled" his partner. 
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An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made briefly 
available. The following summarises its content.  
The victim had been a deminer for four years. He had last attended a revision course two 
months before and had last been on leave 39 days before the accident. The ground at the 
accident site was described as "grazing land: medium hard", meaning a rocky hillside. 
Despite the fact the survey made of the site prior to clearance had indicated only the 
presence of PMN mines, a wide range of fragmentation and bounding fragmentation mines 
had been found. The demining group claimed to have identified the mine involved in the 
accident as an OZM-3 by finding fragments of it.  
The investigators determined that the deminer located a tripwire and informed his superiors. 
Correct procedure required that the wire be pulled from a safe distance. The deminer pulled 
the wire from 30 metres while in a standing position. 
The Team Leader said that warnings were still being given to the third side (part of 
procedure) when the mine exploded unexpectedly. He blamed the survey team for not 
warning them what kinds of mine to expect. 
The Section Leader suspected that the victim assumed that mine was not a bounding 
fragmentation type.  
The victim's partner stated that the order for "pulling" had been given prior to the explosion – 
and this his partner was working properly. He said that the survey team should have warned 
them about the kinds of mines to expect. 
The victim said he was making the rope straight prior to pulling when he stumbled and pulled 
the rope. He claimed he was in a squatting position when the rope was pulled. He said the 
rope should be taken to the tripwire properly and straightened to avoid future accidents. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that the deminer did not execute correct procedures when 
pulling, did not maintain a proper safety distance from the device, and pulled while standing, 
which was against procedure. They further commented that the Section Leader exhibited poor 
command and control. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that deminers should not be allowed to pull a tripwire "or any 
other object/obstacle" in a standing position, or be in too much of a hurry and ignore safety 
distances. They added that the Section Leader concerned should be disciplined for his "poor 
performance and control", and that survey teams should ensure that accurate information 
about the mines and types of mines in a particular area was given. 
[Correct procedure (dictated by the UN MAC) for the pulling or tripwires was that the wire 
should not be pulled unless both ends had been located (and by implication the mine 
identified). The pulling rope should then have been unrolled out to the tripwire, so avoiding 
accidental detonation if it snagged or needed straightening. The tripwire should then have 
been pulled from a distance of at least 50 metres (70 preferred) by a person who was prone 
or behind cover. The procedure stated that the pulling of tripwires connected to a mine was 
unsafe and time consuming, so should be avoided if possible.] 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 194 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
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Compensation: 40,457 Rs Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 
Protection used: not recorded 
 





See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
The victim's injuries were summarised as injuries to his right leg and the right side of body.  
There were no photographs. A medic's sketch (vague) implied two penetrations one below 
the knee and one on the upper thigh. 
The demining group reported that the victim sustained injury to his right knee and right leg. 
The victim had surgery and made a full recovery, returning to work on 15th December 1997. 
The insurers made a compensation payment on 17th April 1988 of 40,457 Rs.  
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because it seems 
that the victim was not following SOPs and his error went uncorrected. His version of events 
is considered "unsafe" because he claimed to have been "squatting", which seems to conflict 
with his injuries. 
It seems likely that the victim was unaware that he was in breach of SOPs as he carried out 
an unfamiliar procedure, and so there may have been a training inadequacy. The secondary 
cause is listed as “Inadequate training”. 
A UN MAC accident summary mentions another deminer injured in this accident. The 
researcher could find no record of that individual in other files so has assumed that a mistake 
was made.   
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this 
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement 
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by 
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.  
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